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Social media become a public sphere for political discussion in the world, with no exception in 
Indonesia. Social media have broadened public engagement but at the same time, it creates an 
inevitable effect of polarization particularly during the heightened political situation such as a 
presidential election. Studies found that there is a correlation between fake news and political 
polarization. In this paper, we identify and the pattern of fake narratives in Indonesia in three different 
time frames: (1) the Presidential campaign (23 September 2018 -13 April 2019); (2) the vote (14-17 
April 2019); (3) the announcement (21-22 May 2019).  We extracted and analyzed a data-set consisting 
of 806,742 Twitter messages, 143 Facebook posts, and 16,082 Instagram posts. We classified 43 fake 
narratives where Twitter was the most used platform to distribute fake narratives massively. The 
accusation of Muslim radical group behind Prabowo and Communist accusation towards the 
incumbent President Joko Widodo were the two top fake narratives during the campaign on Twitter 
and Facebook. The distribution of fake narratives to Prabowo was larger than that to Joko Widodo on 
those three platforms in this period. On the contrary, the distribution of fake narratives to Joko 
Widodo was significantly larger than that to Prabowo during the election and the announcement 
periods. The death threat of Joko Widodo was top fake narratives on these three platforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The existence of the internet has given a significant breakthrough for social and political 
contexts in Indonesia. Historically speaking, the internet has transformed from a medium to 
communicate to a medium to exercise power especially for a powerless group or part of the 
society. The Internet was initially emerged during the political transition in the late 1990s 
when a long-standing authoritarian President Soeharto came to end. It was an alternative 
medium for urban exclusive group members, with less interference from the authority, to 
communicate and exchange information. Then, it transformed into space for greater political 
participation. The information which is completely closed and confined must be changed so 
the public can access the information they need freely (Ahmadi, Rachmiatie, & Nursyawal, 
2019). 
In the present day, social media give greater space for civil society to engage and 
participate in responding to a wide range of issues. Many social movements in Indonesia have 
initially been driven by the power of hashtags such as “#KoinUntukPrita”, “#SaveKPK”, 
“#KamiTidakTakut” (Bohang, 2016). Studies confirm that social media are a room for value 
and belief creation (Bechmann & Lomborg, 2012; Oh, Eom, & Rao, 2015; Rodriguez, 2013), 
and these values and beliefs may even be incorporated in the social and cultural contexts of 
real-life (i.e. offline) (Lim, 2018). Therefore, any opinion that may be circulated among 
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prominent social networking groups may change the way people think and believe. Lim (2013) 
argues that social media activism in Indonesia is more than just “slacktivism” or a random click 
and share; it is rather a transformative form of collective political activism with particular 
agendas. Democracy preserves people’s rights to express their opinion and voices. As a 
platform, social media are able to preserve this right by allowing individuals to create and 
disseminate their own contents, including their opinion. Some scholars warn that social media 
may be counterproductive. Social media can be a double-edged sword which can disseminate 
good as well as bad information (Jalli, 2016). It is possible a person deliberately creates and 
disseminates fake narratives, misleading opinion, hate speech, and other similar contents on 
social media. Social media are effective tools to assist opinion leaders to disseminate political 
ideologies (Jalli, 2016). If social media fails to play its function as a public sphere, particularly 
when fake narratives, hate speech, and misleading information is circulated during the 
heightened political situation such the presidential election, then as Yerlikaya (2020) argues, 
social media and fake news pose threat for democracy.  
Globally, the spread of fake narratives on social media during the heightened political 
situation is a common phenomenon. We have witnessed how Donald Trump won in the 2016 
US Presidential Election by fake narratives and he, even, was awarded a ‘Lie of the Year’ by 
Politifact in 2015 because of his undeniable “mostly false, false or pants on fire” campaign 
statements (Holan & Qiu, 2015). These fake narratives during US election were a symbol of 
‘informational moral panic’ that targeted not a certain group but thickened wider concerns 
surrounding blurred lines between “traditional journalistic channels, click-driven news, the 
extension of mediated voices and the growing role of social media in news distribution” 
(Carlson, 2020). 
The year of 2019 was the most hectic general election that ever occurred in Indonesia 
where more than 190 million of eligible voters voted for five candidates (the President and 
Vice President, the House of Representatives, the Regional House of Representatives in 
Province and Municipality level, as well as the Regional Representative Board). Hence, the 
2019 general election was dubbed as the most complicated, exhaustive, but also a 
breathtaking election in the world (BBC Indonesia, 2019). During that year, the growing 
number of fake narratives or hoaxes circulating on social media was unbelievable. The 
Ministry of Communication and Informatics of the Republic of Indonesia (the MCI) identified 
486 fake news during April 2019, where 209 of them were fake political-related news 
(Maharani, 2019). In addition, the MCI identified 64 hoaxes after the presidential election, 
18th to 20th of April 2019 (Bisnis.com, 2019). The spread of fake narratives, along with hate 
speech, had created a polarization between supporters of the incumbent President Joko 
Widodo (or known as Jokowi) and his most-fierce rival Prabowo.  
Fake news is a critical phenomenon in Indonesia since most of the Indonesian netizens 
have lack of digital information literacy and critical thinking. A study found that educated 
groups such as students find it hard to differentiate between fake and valid news on social 
media (Syam & Nurrahmi, 2020). The online news sites may play a critical role in educating 
their readers about fake news (Yuliarti, 2018). Nevertheless, most of the Indonesian online 
information consumers are tempted by exciting news titles and the way they judge whether 
the information considered fake or not by the presentation of the news that includes choices 
of words (Wijaya, 2019).    
 Previous studies about social media during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election 
highlight some findings such as social media role in lubricating satire political communication 
(Sujoko, 2020) and also constructing social identity and populist discourses (Santoso, Aziz, 
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Pawito, Utari, & Kartono, 2020). Nevertheless, the number studies that show fake narratives 
during this election is limited. Sosiawan and Wibowo (2019) analyze the content of hoaxes on 
social media from August 2018 to March 2019. Even so, it is not clear the process of data 
collection. To fill the gap, this paper shows emerging fake narratives during the 2019 
Indonesian presidential election which uses big data approach for data collection and analysis. 
The primary data derived from three social networking platforms: Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram during three different time frames: (1) the Presidential Campaign (23 September 
2018 -13 April 2019); (2) the Presidential Election (14-17 April 2019); (3) the Presidential 
Announcement (21-22 May 2019). There is a correlation between the use of  Instagram and 
visiting interest followers  (Ahmadi, & Adzhani, 2019). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Internet, Post-Truth and Democracy  
There are two ways scholars treat the internet in the context of political communication: 1) 
as a dependent variable (i.e. internet changes the nature of communication and relationship 
between government, media, citizens and other parties); and 2) as an independent variable 
(i.e. internet as a medium that formed by those parties’ behaviours) (Sarah, Oates & Gibson, 
2006). The most interesting issue in this context is whether the internet is challenging 
democracy or not. The debate around this issue falls in two contradictive opinions which are 
first the internet provides more civil collaboration and deliberative democracy (discussion 
among the US scholars) and, second, the internet needs more public-constitutive elements in 
order to keep its virtual public sphere function (discussion among the European scholars) 
(Brandenburg, 2006). Nevertheless, one of the prominent Bradenburg’s findings is the 
question of whether the internet naturally forms the deliberative environment or should be 
engineered. If the internet gives people information as much as they want as well as provides 
an inclusive and open environment for collaboration and discussions, the question remains 
whether these are preconditions for “ideal democracy”. How if the internet has sort of defect 
that does not provide diverse information or medium for diverse opinions expression?   
 This Bradenburg’s concern is relevant in today post-truth era, a popular term in 2016, 
when questions arise whether the internet exposes diverse opinion or traps people in the like-
minded situation (Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016). The online discussion between “Leave” and 
“Remain” groups during Brexit in 2016, for example, showed clear two perspectives of the 
internet in the post-truth politics. First, it may provide political discussion forums with diverse 
voices. But, second, people who engage on those forums, in fact, create what is called 
“political homophily”, a condition where shared and exclusive political meaning within a like-
minded group that affecting on people’s way of thinking, attitude, as well as interaction 
(Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014). Pariser (2011) raised concern about the inevitable ‘filter 
bubble’ trap where technology determines people’s online preferences i.e., information. This 
condition poses threat to democracy when people voice is driven by an actor with hidden 
political agenda who created manipulative populist and political discourses that are circulated 
and echoed by technology (Santoso et al., 2020; Yerlikaya, 2020).  
 
Fake Narratives, Social Media, and Polarization 
There are several terminologies that describe fake narratives: hoaxes, fake news, misleading 
contents, and false information. The definition of “fake news” in this paper refers to false 
information intentionally produced to manipulate readers. Vojak (2017) divides fake news 
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(some) Hate Speech 
into two types: accidental and intentional. Accidental fake news may be caused by reckless 
people who just post news and had no idea that their posts would be viral in the next day.  In 
contrast, intentional fake news is created deliberately by an actor or group of actors who also 
involves fake accounts in order to create chaos. Perhaps a question could rise with this 
division is who would have known of someone’s intention once the fake news was viral on 
social media.  
According to UNESCO, there is three types of ‘information disorder’: (1) Mis-
information (false information shared by a person who believes is true and with no prior fact-
checking); (2) Dis-information (a deliberative lie and false information intentionally created 
and shared); and (3) Mal-information (true and reality-based information but shared to create 
chaos or harm a person, organization, or country) (UNESCO, 2018). Figure 1 shows 
disinformation lies in a sliced section between misinformation and mal-information. It may be 
interpreted that disinformation is not considered as 100 per cent false or intent to harm 
information. Below is a further explanation of some narratives that classified as these three 
types of information disorder: 
 False context: the information that could be derived from a real event, but it may be 
reproduced, recirculated, and shared away from the real context. A photo, which may 
be taken years ago, went viral with a different meaning nowadays.   
 Imposter content: To make false information in a convincing way, it is possible for 
someone to use mainstream media’s logos, templates, or even fonts on the content.  
 Manipulated content: contents that aim to deceive or manipulate people’s opinion.  
 Fabricated content: almost similar to manipulated content  
 
 It is hard to distinguish these narratives or contents. But the common thing between 
them is that the content is framed in such a way to convince others that it is true. Also, the 
production of disinformation could be intentionally aimed to misinform or to lead 
misperception. Rumata and Sastrosubroto (2018) argue that information in post-truth era is 
a form of net-attack 2.0 which is the reproduction of (could be) valid news that reframed in 














Figure 1: Information Disorder Types (UNESCO, 2018, p.46) 
 
 Post-truth is a phenomenon where people are losing trust and interest in facts 
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). The truth in post-truth era is never been discovered, 
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Lies, baseless arguments, lack of evidence claims, misleading information which are 
repeatedly produced, reproduced, distributed and redistributed, to some extent, create a 
reality. People failed to think objectively and simply do fact-check of all the information that 
is received on social media. Being misinformed is something regular and acceptable as Lim 
(2013) argues as the typical of “the principles of the contemporary culture of consumption” 
that most of the social media users tend to share information because it has ‘clickbait’ title or 
misleading memes.  
 
Social Media and Polarization in Indonesian Democracy 
Social media have been a pivotal element in Indonesian politics at least for the last five years. 
Their role in creating a public sphere for freedom of expression may preserve the 
sustainability of the democratic system in the country. However, the practice of freedom of 
expression becomes paradox when this right has been misused by spreading fake narratives 
to smooth own hidden agendas.  
 Identity such as ethnic, religious, and ideology is the center of Indonesian political 
discourse. Religion, particularly, has been long-standing existing in Indonesian political history 
(Fuad, 2014). That is why religious fake narrative is proven to be an effective political 
campaign to drive people opinion and even worse to create the polarization. It may strongly 
emerge during Jakarta gubernatorial election back in 2017 where a Chinese-Christian 
candidate Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama competed for head to head with his second-round 
rival an Arab-Muslim candidate Anies Baswedan. During this election, campaigns that 
attacked identities of a minority group in the society (i.e. Chinese and Christian) are legitimate 
and acceptable (Lim, 2017; Putra, 2016). Inevitably, fake news creates “us” and “them” in the 
form of “Pribumi” and “non-Pribumi”.  
 This typical religious fake narrative campaign also occurred during the 2019 
presidential election. The prominent Muslim radical figure and also Islamic Defender Front 
(Front Pembela Islam/ FPI) leader Habib Rizieq Shihab openly supported the four-time 
Presidential candidate Prabowo Subiakto (Lazuardi, 2019). Meanwhile, Prabowo’s rival, the 
incumbent President Joko Widodo was accused of being insufficiently Muslim who promotes 
anti-Muslim and anti-Ulama movement (Republika online, 2019). The fake narratives that 
existed during this Presidential election are a reproduction of fake news that emerged during 
the 2014 Presidential election (i.e. Joko Widodo was accused as a communist) with the 
incumbent government as the main target (Sosiawan & Wibowo, 2019).  The fierce campaign 
strategies to counter fake narratives attacks was not solely executed by the candidates but 
also relentless buzzers of each supporter who work 24/7 either individually or in group team 
(Wareza, 2019). Satire political contents emerged and went viral on social media, as responses 
among millennials of thickened polarization that includes the fictive Presidential candidate 
Nurhadi-Aldo (“dildo”) and Prabowo VS Jokowi-Epic Rap Battles of Presidency (Sujoko, 2020). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper identifies and analyzes the fake narratives based on UNESCO’s information 
disorder type on three social media platforms: Instagram, Twitter and Facebook. We use the 
Intelijen Persepsi Analisis (Intelligence Perceptive Analysis/ IPA) system developed by 
Indonesia Indicator Company, a strategic and big data company which is well known among 
central government and local government. The high-level process of the system consists of 
three parts, which are:  
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1. The data sources that may include: Twitter (tweets, retweets, replies, and hashtags); 
Facebook (text captions, comments, photos, and videos); and Instagram (text captions 
and comments)  
2. The data extraction and cleaning  
3. The data analysis (data mining, statistics, GIS analysis, network analysis)  
 
The second layer of this high-level process consists of three steps:  
1. Crawler: a system for data reading or skimming to map out the data based on indexes 
on each of social media platforms.     
2. Pipeline/ NLP (Natural Language Processing): a program to process, to analyze, to 
understand, and make sense of crawled data in a manner that is valuable. The output 
of this step is that data show some of the characteristics such as id account, text, 
sentiment, emotions, as well as demography.  
3. Analytics: the final process where data analyzed and visualized in various ways on the 
dashboard.  
 
The data are collected in three different time frames: 1) the Presidential Campaign (23 
September 2018 - 13 April 2019); 2) the Presidential Vote (14-17 April 2019); 3) the 
Presidential Announcement (21-22 May 2019). These timelines show before, during, after the 
Presidential election and also ultimately during the announcement which we argue that the 
circulation of fake narratives during these time is critical. We exercise numbers of keywords 
to the system to extract the data.  
We determine the keywords through observation and media literature. The “cebong”, 
“kampret”, “kaum bumi datar” or “bani micin” are popular terms that identify Joko Widodo 
or Prabowo’s supporters.  The keywords also include trending topics during the election such 
as “#2019Ganti Presiden”, #2019TetapJokowi, and #TNIpolisibukanpolitisi. Some of the labels 
previously appeared during Jakarta Gubernatorial Election in 2017 such as “bani koplak” (the 
idiot tribe) and “kaum bumi datar” (flat-earth people) which was labelled anti-Ahok 
supporters (Lim, 2017). Table 1 shows 82 keywords that had been exercised to collect the 
data.  
 
Table 1: Keywords of fake narratives  
Refers to Joko Widodo Refers to Prabowo General  
Joko Widodo Prabowo Subianto Bunuh 
Jokowi Prabowo Bakar 
Kyai Hj. Ma’ruf Amin Sandiaga Uno Tembak 
Ma’ruf Sandi Bangsat 
Cebong  Kampret  Anjing 
01 02 Monyet 
PKI Khilafah  Babi 
Partai Komunis Indonesia HTI Kristen 
Komunis Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Islam  
Cina Sumbu Pendek LGBT 
China Prabohong  Ulama 
Tiongkok Sandiwara Uno  Dungu 
Kafir Radikal  Waras 
Jokodok Teroris  Korupsi  
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#2019GantiPresiden Pelanggaran HAM  Orang Gila 
#2019TetapJokowi ISIS Mukidi 
#Jokowisekalilagi Kaum Bumi Datar  #INAElectionobserverSOS 
Anti Ulama  Bani Micin  Perang  
Partai Setan  Politik Genderuwo Poling pilpres 
Rezim Dzalim  2030 Politik islam 
Jaenudin Nachiro #prabowobentengnkri #golput 
Kelas menengah ngehe #tutup01tusuk02  
Unicorn  #prabowosanditakterbendung  
IQ 200 Sekolam Capres  
Politik Sontoloyo   
#jokowitheerrorman   
#01caprespendustaabadi   
#TNIpolisibukanpolitisi   
Diktator   
#Jokowilagi   
#JokowiAmin   
Pemimpin Pendusta   
#Jokowi2periode   
#jokowiDILANjutkanlagi   
Antek Asing   
Penista Agama   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We manage to crawl at least 1.07 million fake narrative posts as well as tweets during these 
timelines. As seen in Table 2, Twitter is the most frequently used platform to distribute these 
kinds of contents which covers around 91.45 per cent. It is then followed by Facebook which 
is around 7.97 per cent and Instagram was the least one which contains 0.58 per cent. In the 
context of political and public engagement, Twitter probably is the platform that is mostly 
studied by scholars. The political discussion in this platform tends to be less uncivil and more 
deliberate although lack of empathy and respect (Jaidka, Zhou, & Lelkes, 2019). Some of the 
Indonesian scholars were interested to study the sentiment analysis during the presidential 
election through Twitter (Ardiansyah, 2019; Nurhuda, Sihwi, & Doewes, 2013). They may be 
able to show the sentiment analysis quantitatively, but they could not be able to show the 
details of the narrative.  
 
Table 2: Tweeting and Posting Timeline   
Time Frame  Twitter Facebook  Instagram  Total  
23rd Sept 2018 - 13th April 2019 826,914 143,665 16,082 986,661 
14 - 17 April 2019 73,932 10,389 1,672 85,993 
21 - 22 May 2019  4,649 1,422 213 6,284 
total  905,495 155,476 17,967 1,078,938 
Source: obtained from primary data 
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 We classify the data set in table 2 into specific issues based on outstanding narratives. 
The content classification also based on article number 28 of the ITE law. There are 43 
classifications of issues during the presidential campaign; 12 classifications of issues during 
the presidential election; and, 6 classifications of issues during the presidential 
announcement. The frequency of fake narrative posts that attacked Prabowo is higher by 
numbers than that of Joko Widodo (Figure 2). However, the variance of fake narrative issues 
that attacked Prabowo is lesser than that of Joko Widodo (Figure 3).   
 
 
Figure 2: The frequency of fake narratives on three platforms  
 
 
Figure 3:  the variance of Fake Narratives on three platforms  
 
In Table 3, there are 43 fake narrative themes during the presidential campaign. At 
least there were 559,446 posts (56.7 per cent) on these platforms that attacked Prabowo 
while there were 427,215 (43.3 per cent) posts that attacked Joko Widodo. Nevertheless, the 
variance of issues that attack Joko Widodo is higher than the ones to Prabowo which are 65.1 
per cent to 34.9 per cent. Radicalism, communism, and pro-foreigner allegation are the top 
three issues during this period. Radicalism mostly attacked Prabowo while communist and 
pro-foreigner allegations attacked Joko Widodo.  
 
Table 3: The fake narratives classifications during the Presidential Campaign 
No 
Fake Narratives themes 
23rd of Sept 2018 - 13th of April 2019 
Twitter FB IG Total  Adversary 
1 Radical Islamist groups support Prabowo's 
Indonesian presidency 130,123 30,515 1,171 
156,682 Prabowo 
2 Jokowi Communist Allegation 133,317 21,096 2,269 161,809 Joko Widodo 
3 Jokowi as a "pro-foreigner" 92,811 10,781 1,751 105,343 Joko Widodo 
4 Ratna Sarumpaet's false assault claim 86,109 14,688 1,438 102, 235 Prabowo 
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5 Russian political consultant behind Prabowo  65,801 4,944 96 70,841 Prabowo 
6 Prabowo violated human rights  59,514 859 684 61,057 Prabowo 
7 Prabowo's electability claims 40,731 2,921 305 43,957 Prabowo 
8 Prabowo Christmas Celebration 25,406 5,640 778 31,824 Prabowo 
9 Prabowo 's son LGBT status 18,045 701 390 19,136 Prabowo 
10 Jokowi hidden earpiece during debate 15,183 55 97 15,335 Joko Widodo 
11 Muslim "Ulama" leader Criminalization  14,212 4,519 596 19,327 Joko Widodo 
12 Jokowi supports LGBT 13,915 1,676 282 15,873 Joko Widodo 
13 Central Java leaders' endorsement to 
Jokowi  
11,194 2,286 160 
13,640 
Joko Widodo 
14 Jokowi family's alleged corruption  10,874 430 35 11,339 Joko Widodo 
15 Uno family members support Jokowi  9,682 646 377 10,705 Prabowo 
16 Blood tubing  polemic  8,654 2,431 209 11,294 Joko Widodo 
17 Jokowi meets Freeport CEO 7,597 146 186 7,929 Joko Widodo 
18 Jokowi misuse the state facilities for 
presidential campaign 
7,590 1,480 195 9,265 Joko Widodo 
19 Tabloid Indonesia Barokah 6,983 1,682 245 8,910 Prabowo 
20 Scandal video of Sandiaga Uno 6,584 159 49 6,792 Prabowo 
21 "Pepes" Campaign in Karawang  6,467 127 79 6,673 Joko Widodo 
22 Mbah Maimoen pray 6,350 4,958 2 11,310 Joko Widodo 
23 Communist Allegation to Prabowo 6,127 10,336 1,279 17,742 Prabowo 
24 "Dana Desa" claim 5,858 13 167 6,038 Joko Widodo 
25 Prabowo's Chinese Descendant 5,615 9,470 1,589 16,674 Prabowo 
26 Indonesia's debt to Chinese Republic 4,024 2,664 461 7,149 Joko Widodo 
27 Seven ballot containers 3,851 3,879 336 8,066 Joko Widodo 
28 The national budget for IMF-WB event in 
Bali 
3,130 208 126 3,464 Joko Widodo 
29 HTI Flag burning 2,679 61 31 2,771 Prabowo 
30 Luhut's envelope 2,486 136 22 2,644 Joko Widodo 
31 Hat Communist symbol during debate 2,366 10 15 2,391 Joko Widodo 
32 Jokowi bans Azan 2,358 34 20 2,412 Joko Widodo 
33 the precondition to move voting place 2,155 38 92 2,285 Joko Widodo 
34 Ahok replaces Ma'ruf Amin as Vice 
President candidate 
1,950 404 33 2,387 Joko Widodo 
35 Jakarta Gubenotarial election campaign 
fund 
1,637 162 27 1,826 Joko Widodo 
36 the hacking of Uztad Abdul Somad's social 
media account 
1,568 123 21 1,712 Joko Widodo 
37 The Army vehicle for Prabowo campaign 1,481 255 10 1,746 Prabowo 
38 Hundreds Fake physical e-KTP  880 127 13 1,020 Joko Widodo 
39 Voting abroad 671 506 185 1,362 Joko Widodo 
40 Fake video about unemployment  527 1 14 542 Joko Widodo 
41 The criminalization of Prabowo supporters 322 2,405 234 2,961 Joko Widodo 
42 Najwa supports Prabowo-Sandi 80 48 11 139 Prabowo 
43 Karni Ilyas was summoned to the 
Presidential Palace 
7 45 2 54 Joko Widodo 
Source: obtained from primary data 
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Table 4 shows fake narrative themes that emerged during the Presidential Election. 
Unlike during the Presidential campaign period, the frequency of fake narratives to Joko 
Widodo was significantly higher than that of Prabowo. There were 74,677 (86.8 %) 
unfavourable social media posts for Joko Widodo while there were only 11,316 unfavourable 
(13.2 %) posts for Prabowo.  
The issue of Prabowo supporters’ social media accounts hacking incident is the 
prominent issues, although personal religious of both candidates remain the target of the 
attack. Prabowo presidential campaign team spokesperson Ahmad Riza Patria accused that 
government, in this case, Joko Widodo administration, hacked Prabowo’s supporter that 
included publicly known political allies such as Said Didu (CNN Indonesia, 2019). The discourse 
of “hoax factory” was constructed and aimed to question government’s neutrality in politics 
while (at that time) President Joko Widodo ran for the election. It appeared not only on social 
media but also on mainstream media.  
 
Table 4: The fake narratives classifications during the Presidential Vote  
No 
Fake Narratives themes 
14th - 17th of April 2019 
Twitter FB IG Total  Adversary 
1 Prabowo supporters’ account hacking 
incident 28,708 5,000 619 
34,327 Joko Widodo 
2 LGBT community supports Jokowi-
Amin 118 64 10 
192 Joko Widodo 
3 The chaotic voting abroad  1,158 291 13 1,462 Joko Widodo 
4 Prabowo supports Khilafah system 2,051 921 73 3,045 Prabowo 
5 Religious blasphemer among Jokowi 
supporters 
203 270 15 488 
Joko Widodo 
6 Jokowi Communist Allegation 2,315 98 60 2,473 Joko Widodo 
7 Jokowi personal religious attack 6,538 42 219 6,799 Joko Widodo 
8 Prabowo personal religious attack 5,898 18 255 6,171 Prabowo 
9 Allan Naim’s journalist documents 2,018 77 5 2,100 Prabowo 
10 Prabowo-Sandi website hacking  3,039 113 20 3,172 Joko Widodo 
11 Sexy Killers documentary film 4,594 34 12 4,640 Joko Widodo 
12 Quick Count chaos 17,292 3,461 371 21,124 Joko Widodo 
Source: obtained from primary data 
 
Lastly, Table 5 shows fake narratives that emerged during the presidential 
announcement. The number of social media post that attacked Joko Widodo was higher, 
which were 4,297 posts (68.4 %), than that to his rival Prabowo which were 1,987 posts (31.6 
%). The death threat of Joko Widodo stands out among emerging fake narratives. Communism 
accusation to Joko Widodo remained to be existing. The interesting part during this period is 
the emerging of issue that is supposed to be favourable for Prabowo in which he is not the 
actor behind chaotic student-led protests in 1998 or what known as “Tragedi Semanggi”. 
These findings may be contrary to a previous study conducted. Santoso and Nugroho (2019) 
analyze sentiment tendency on Facebook from 17 April 2019 until 22 May 2019. They found 
that both of the candidates obtained positive sentiment (85 per cent positive sentiment 
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Table 5: The fake narratives classifications during the Presidential Announcement  
No 
Fake Narratives themes 
21st – 22nd of May 2019 
Twitter FB IG Total  Adversary 
1 Shooting rumour  468 3 50 521 Joko Widodo 
2 The death threat of Jokowi 1,770 563 81 2,414 Joko Widodo 
3 Prabowo was not responsible for chaos 
student-led protests in 1998 1,496 264 26 
1,786 Prabowo 
4 Jokowi Communist Allegation 679 385 37 1,101 Joko Widodo 
5 Radical Islamist groups support 
Prabowo's Indonesian presidency 
58 138 5 201 
Prabowo 
6 “Police from China” shot protesters  178 69 14 261 Joko Widodo 
Source: obtained from primary data 
 
In the post-truth era, people engage online with less critical thinking and more 
emotion appealing in the political context. The Candidate’s policy agenda becomes less 
relevant information for political voters as Lim (2017) found it during Jakarta Gubernatorial 
election in 2017. The politic of identity during the 2019 Presidential election may not be as 
thick as the 2017 gubernatorial election. Both candidates are Muslim but have very different 
social and cultural backgrounds. Prabowo was born and raised in an upper-class family. His 
father was a high-profile economist Soemitro Djojohadikusumo and also was a minister in 
Soekarno’s – the founding father and first Indonesian President – administration. Prabowo is 
well educated and used to be Soekarno’s son in law (Viva online, 2019a). His rival Joko 
Widodo, on the other hand, represents most of Indonesians. He was born and raised in a 
typical Indonesian lower-class family. He worked hard to become a successful businessman. 
His political career began when he was elected as a Mayor of Solo in 2005 and reelected in 
2010. He, then, successfully won Jakarta Governor Election in 2012 and elected as a President 
in 2014 (Viva online, 2019b). Both candidates have contrast political communication and 
campaign styles. Prabowo used populist campaign which defending marginalized commoners 
against the elite. Rhetorically, he framed government as corrupt, abusive of power and failure 
particularly to bring economic prosperity for Indonesian people (Ritonga & Adela, 2020). His 
campaign-style tended overheated i.e., slammed podium at a campaign event. In contrast, 
Joko Widodo is a President of all Indonesians from Sabang (the most western city in North 
Sumatera) to Merauke (the most eastern city in West Papua). His “blusukan” approach 
(hearing from grass-root community) and a traditional protocol breaker are perceived as a 
humble and charmed President. Therefore, Joko Widodo was the toughest rival for Prabowo. 
It is to be noted that the 2019 election was the fourth time for Prabowo in attempting to 
become a President of the Republic of Indonesia.  
What matters on political campaigns and discussions is the construction of common 
enemies or threats (Lim, 2017). Radicalism, communism, or unpopular political frames such 
as “pro-foreigner” and “pro-LGBT” are common labels to create common enemies in 
Indonesia. Radicalism discourse may be initially constructed since a prominent radical 
conservative Muslim group leader Habib Rizieq Shihab declared support to Prabowo and Vice 
President Candidate Sandiaga Uno. During Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, Rizieq Shihab 
extended his popularity and influence not only in Jakarta but also nationally. He initiated 
several mass rallies to sentence who they call as Islamic blasphemer Ahok during the 2017 
Jakarta governor election. He is also Head of Supervisory Board of a National Movement of 
An Analysis of Fake Narratives on Social Media during 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election 
Vience Mutiara Rumata & Fajar Kuala Nugraha 
 
362 E-ISSN: 2289-1528 
https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2020-3604-22 
Indonesian Ulama Council Fatwa Guards (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI / GNPF-
MUI). This organization officially expanded into a National Movement of Ulama Fatwa Guards 
without MUI involvement (Sumandoyo, 2019). It is worth to note that MUI was established in 
1975 to support the government in creating a peaceful and prosperous society based on 
Pancasila, the philosophy of Indonesian state (Hasyim, 2011).  
The other common enemy frames during Presidential Election are Communism, pro-
foreigner and LGBT. This finding confirms that Prabowo’s effort to frame his rival Joko Widodo 
as “a secularist, communist, and agent of foreign interest” during the Presidential campaign 
(Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018). Prabowo openly warned that Indonesia, under Joko Widodo 
administration, is being too open for foreigners so that pose a threat to the local workers. This 
statement was made to respond to the new presidential regulation number 20 of 2018 which 
has been signed by president Joko Widodo (Llewellyn, 2019). This regulation authorized the 
company to hire foreign workers in order to increase foreign investment in the nation. A fake 
issue of “10 million Chinese mainland workers invade Indonesia” which appeared in 2016 
(Turnbackhoax, 2016), reappeared and went viral on social media in 2019.  
The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) issues mostly are controversial 
issues among conservative and traditional Indonesians. Not only within the whole Indonesian 
society, but the unpleasant frame of LGBT also exists among academicians particularly in the 
study of Media and Communication field (Rumata, 2019). The number of attacking violence 
toward the LGBT community particularly is increased since the early of 2010s (Ridwan & Wu, 
2018). A recent offensive movement against LGBT community occurred in 2017 where 141 
people allegedly attacked a Jakarta-based gay club (NBC News, 2017). FPI notoriously invades 
LGBT community forums that include international LGB communion the 2010 International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Association (ILGA) conference in Surabaya 
and LGBT’s the Q! Film Festival in Jakarta. Same-sex homophobia immanent exists both in 
personal, society and even national levels. In the society level, LGBT considered as a 
communicable virus like HIV that would be infected to young generations. Meanwhile, the 
recent judicial review of the Criminal Code (KUHP) has sparked protest from the LGBT 
community since it may legally harm individual freedom (Ridwan & Wu, 2018). A Joko Widodo 
and Maruf Amin campaign logo allegedly similar to the LGBT movement logo – colourful 
stripes – went viral on social media.   
Nevertheless, these fake narratives that are circulated on social media may jeopardize 
the Indonesian political and democratic system in the future. Some of the fake narratives that 
escalated on 2019 presidential election are continuing during Joko Widodo second-term 
administration. The terminology of “kadal gurun” (or popularly known as kadrun), which 
refers to right-wing extremists and fundamentalist group of people, create public debate both 
in social media and mainstream media. Most of the people who offended this label accused 
there is growing communist sympathizers who against Islam (detikcom, 2020).  
Hampton, Shin, and Lu (2017) might find that social media particularly Facebook and 
Twitter have a direct and negative impact on daily political conversations both on- and offline 
social settings. However, this finding does not appear in the Indonesian political context. The 
polarization that occurred online may affect in offline setting (i.e. during 2017 Jakarta 
Gubernatorial Election conversation – Lim 2017) and may affect not only the personal social 
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CONCLUSION 
This research study analyzes the pattern of fake narratives on three social media platforms: 
Instagram, Twitter and Facebook in three different time frames: 1) the Presidential Campaign 
(23 September 2018 -13 April 2019); 2) the Presidential Vote (14-17 April 2019); 3) the 
Presidential Announcement (21-22 May 2019).  
 This study also identifies more than 43 fake narrative themes during the 2019 
Indonesian presidential election. The frequency of fake narratives that attacked Prabowo is 
slightly higher by numbers than that of Joko Widodo which is 53.1 per cent to 46.9 per cent. 
But in terms of variance, fake narratives that attacked Joko Widodo are more various than 
ones that attacked Prabowo which is 67.2 per cent to 32.8 per cent. 
 The fake narratives were more massively distributed on the Twitter platform than on 
Instagram and Facebook. The most frequent circulation of fake news occurred during the 
presidential campaign period since this period is longer than the presidential election and 
announcement. The fake narratives, in terms of frequency and variance, mostly attacked 
Prabowo than Joko Widodo in this period. Radicalism, communism, and pro-foreigner 
allegation are the top three fake narratives. Radicalism mostly attacked Prabowo while 
communist and pro-foreigner allegations attacked Joko Widodo.  
 During the presidential vote and announcement periods, fake narratives that attacked 
Joko Widodo is higher than that to Prabowo in terms of frequency and variance. The incident 
of Prabowo supporters’ account by Joko Widodo’s is the most prominent fake narrative than 
others during the Presidential Vote. While the death threat of Joko Widodo was the most 
prominent fake narrative during the Presidential Announcement period.  
 This study found that radicalism, communism, “pro-foreigner” and “pro-LGBT” are 
constructive issues created by both candidates in order to gain public supports. Not only that, 
some labels created and circulated on social media during the 2019 election are similar with 
the ones that emerged during the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election such as “cebong” and 
“kampret”. We suggest future research regarding this topic would focus on the “master 
narrative” of fake narrative campaigns in the Presidential election which the limitation of this 
study. This master narrative plays a significant role to build meaning in a specific context and 
helps us to understand these fake narratives in the Presidential election history as well as in 
what way it relates to us.  
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